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High-level group of experts on the CFSP
First report
"European security policy towards 2000 :
ways and means to establish genuine credibility"
Brussels, 19 December 1994
This report was drawn at up the request of Mr Hans van den Broelg acting in
his official capacity. However, the assessments, judgments, ideas and proposals
it contains are those of the members of the goup alone and do not represent the
views of the Commission.II.
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22Introduction
The group of experts (see list of members  at Annex l) was asked to identiff the requirements
for the creation of a credible cosunon foreign and security policy (CFSP) by the yeat 2000.
Its mandate was principally  to consider aspects of security in the strict sense and to proceed
on the basis of individual written contributions coupled with collective  analysis  and
discussion. Inevitably it was not able to cover wider aspects such as the functioni.r g of the
international  political and economic system, development assistance, trade, invesfrnent glows,
the transfer of technology - which clearly also contribute to European security  and
international stability. The idea was to begin with the new dimension created by the
Maastricht  Treaty, Title V of which established  a "Common  Foreign and Security Policy", and
to concEntrate, in a first report, on the structural deficiencies  of Title V.
The work was inaugurated on 17 March by a working meeting with Mr Van den Broek.
following which we initially conducted our discussion in full session, before splitting up into
five specialist  subcommittees.r This report represents the fruit of our labours.
It starts with an overview of the operation of the CFSP to date, including its relationship with
the WEU, then sketches in the existing and foreseeable international background, in other
words the dangers, threats and geopolitical  developments which the European Union is facing.
and is likely to face, now and in the short to medium term.
Two conclusions  emerge from this part of the report: first, the serious shortcomings  of the
CFSP and the WEU, and second, the build-up of risks, threats and major geopolitical changes
for which the European Union should be, but is not, making active preparations. On this basis
we then considered what measures and reforms would be necessary to bring the CFSP up to
speed.
It quickly became apparent that a number of the ideas and proposals we formulated in this
context would involve no amendment to the Maastricht Treaty, whether in terms of the text
of Title V proper, the institutional balance between the three pillars or the relationship
between the European Union and the WEU.
We therefore felt that these ideas and proposals should receive immediate detailed
consideration, even thought it is likely that they could be imnlemented nnly graduallv.
probably over a priod of years.
Thc fivc subcommittccswcrc:  Evaluarionof  risk end thrcats (chaircd by Mr Michacl Stucrmcr);  EU/WEUNATOInstitutional
Cohcrcncc (Mr Hcnri Fromcnt-Mcuricc); Economic aspccs of sccurity  (Mr Hcrman Muldcr); Values  (Rcvd. Edouard Hen),
thc Dccision+naking  proccss (Mr Edmond  wcllcnstcin).2
There is little doubt in sul minds that they would lend greater weight and effectiveness to a
poticy which is trecoming  increasingly  a measure of the Union's credibility both internaltly and
externally.
Necessary  though they are, however, these measures would not in themselves be enough to
endow the CFSP with lasting effectiveness, and hence credibility. Clearly, it is essential to
seize the opporhmity offered by the Intergovernmental  Conference to introduce  more mdical
refonns involving imendments  to Title V, a review of the institutional atrangements  and
clarification of the place of foreign and security policy, including defence, in the edilice of
the European Union.?
The CFSP (including the relationship with the WEII) as it cwrently operates
There is no denying that activity has been stepped up in the short period since the entry into
force of the Maastricht  Treaty and the start-up of the CFSP in November  1993. Hardly aday
goes by without a meeting of a specialist working party in Brussels; Co'reper usuelly has at
least one CFSP-related item on its weekly agendn6  the Political Direcms  consult at least
once a fortnight in the Political Committee;  and the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve (and
the Sixteen)  meet practically  every month- At &e same time the pace of work in the WEU
context involving the Ministers  of Foreign Atrairs and Defence, Ambassadas, Chiefs of Staff,
the Permanent Planning Cell and various r*'orking parties, while less sustained,  has
nevertheless picked up considerably.
Nor should we ignore certain developments  conducive to the emergerrc of a European
defence identity, including:
-  the NATO Summit declaration in Janrnry 1994, which among other things gave
European NATO members the green ligfit to use Alliance resources and facilities for
their own requirements, via the immediarely operational "Combined  Joint Task Force"
(CJTF) conc€pt;
the readiness to place multinational forces (Eurocorps, Anglo-Dutch amphibious force,
the rapid reaction force, ARRC) at the disposition of the WEU in liaison with the
CJTF;
the planned stengthening of Eurocorps. which is due to become operational in 1995,
and other joint military initiatives;
the ruling of the Karlsnrhe Constitutional Court allowing German troops to operate
outside NATO territory.
The problem is that there is frankly nothing to show for all this activity. all the fresh starts
and "progress"; on the contrary, there is an increasing sense of unease at tre impotence  and
drift highfighted week after week by current issues and their reflection in fre media This is
tme even of the "joint actions" initiated by the European Council. notably at the special
session marking the entry into force of the Ma"stricht Treaty held in Brussels on
29 October 1993. With the possible exception of the Stabilrty Pact thes" have n'i ^\lv t"-ned
out to be poorly planned, hard to implement and disappointing both in sc@e and in terms of
their meagre results.
In this context the humanitarian aid operation for Bosnia-Herzegovna last winter is
particularly dismaying.  Approved within weeks. without any proper stu$' of conditions  in
the field" bogged down in the minutiae of budgetary wrangles about s'hich the public,
fortunately, remained in ignorance, it was not fr-nally implemented until the winter was over -
too late.4
We could cite other examples, fortunately  less alarming,  but never0reless illustrating  the twin
perils of blinkered  concentratioa  6a hactily conceived loint actions" on the one hzrnd and
sterile bureaucratization  on the other, at the expense of soundly-based strategic thinking and
systematic attention to the Union's fundamental corlmon interests'
At the wEU, q/hich accord.ing to Article J.4 of Title V of the Maastricht  Treaty is "an:integral
part of the deve'opment  of the Union" and as such is reQueo€d  uto elaborate and implement
decisions and actlns of the Union which have defence implications",  the picture is equally
discouraging.
The WEU is still nowhere near ready to think about setting up an actual force prcrjection
capability endowed with the nec€ssary  intelligence,  command and logistical resources,, Work
,  has not progressed as far as the study stage even on the operational role of the WEU, far less
on the necessary resources.
It has yet to face up to the fraught issue of the legat and practical linkage between Article 5
of the Brussels Treaty and commitnents entered into under NATO.2
It is accumulating a string of "special  status" observers  and associate partners - and thiis at the
very time when the Eurclpean Union is poised for frrrther enlargement - an approach which
simply serves to blur the concepts of a common defence policy and common defencre'
It continues to debate plans for a possible future European armarnents  agency' while many
have aiready abandoned  the idea and are making other arrangements,  even through  such an
agency was expressly  foreseen in article V of the declaration  concerning  the WEU attached
to the Treaty of M"astricht.
In sum, the inertia and impotence of the CFSP and WEU are the inward and routward
reflection of a lack of capacity or will to act, particularly as regards the threat and/or use of
force by the Union.
Yet this is absolutely  crucial, for without the proper combination  of diplomacy and a ,capacity
to project force there cannot be a credible CFSP, as has been amply demonstrated bo'th in the
Yugoslav crisis and, prior to that in the Gulf War.
t  Arri"l" V, If any of thc l{igh Contracring  Psrtics should  bc thc objcct of an armcd attack in Europc, $g@l  High Contracling
parties will, in accordancr wirh thc provisions  of Articlc 5 I of thc chartcr of thc unitcd Nations,  afford  the Party so attackcd
all the miliury  and other aid and assistancr  in thcir powcr.5
U.  The issues at stake: the build-up of new risks and threats, fundamental
geopolitical changg and the crisis in our system of beliefs and values
The doubts justifiably firelled by the dithering  and impotence in the CFSP and the WEU will
prove particularly damaging to the Union and its immediate and longer-term  interests in the
face of proliferating  conflicts and the build-up of destabilizing  factors in Russia, Uhaine, the
Balkans, Algeria and elsewhere,  already outstripping the capacity  of individual Member States
to intervene, and in a world where the major players, from the United States dowrL are
repositioning themselves for global competition which is quite likely to result in friction
betrveen major regional entities.
These doubts will also inevitably undermine the Union and its abilitv to propagate its value
system-in the face of societies increasingly  atfracted by individualism and short-termism in
the West and a prey to cultural, ethnic or religious ferment to the East and South.
The sudden disappearance  of the old intemational order with the tuo nuclear superpowers
seems to have left the EU particularly exposed and helpless, paradoxically  so, since Europe
is at the very heart of the current geopolitical shifu.
At the same time the United States, on which Europe in the final analysis continues to depend
for its security, has been preoccupied with domestic issues and, extemally, with Russia and
the fate of its nuclear atsenal, the Middle East (the Gulf War, the peace process, Iran and
Iraq), its own continent (NAFTA), and the huge economic, financial and technical potential
of the Asia-Pacific  (APEC) region.
More recently, reacting perhaps to an essay published by Professor Samuel P. Huntington of
Harvard entitled "The Clash of Civilizations", America seems to have reawoken to the
importance of cultual aft-ity in defrning identity and long-term  interest, and has hence
"rediscovered" the EU. This may explain the acceptance  of a European defence identity
within a restructure4 twin-pillar NATO, unless of course that decision simply reflects
galloping  isolationism and indifference rather than culrural affrnity.
Taken together, these long-range tends in US policy call for the gradual refonnulation, on
new foundations, of what used to be called "leadership"  but Washingfon would now like to
see as "partnership in leadership".
The precondition for this is an ef,flective European  foreign and security poliq, including
defence and force projection.  In the absence of such a policy the United States is going to
find it dif[rcult to provide continuing a sfttegic gurantee cover for a Union with dwindling
political and military credibility which is at the same time expanding northwards and
eastwards, up to the Russian frontier.
The combination  of US "repositioning" and the EU's problem in reconciling its (inevitable)
enlargement with greater integration, particularly in security matten. cries out for urgent6
upscaling of the transatlantic  dialogue, at the very time when the union itself is bes;et by
dangers all around.
while the rethink has been under way in the united states, a daznd Russia has been picking
up the pieces and to some extent reasserting its geopolitical identity, setting out to rcor*garizr
its former imperial sphere of influence. It is as yet not clear whether this will take the form
of a yacnful re-ordering in the form of a common market or commonwealth,  or a
political-military  solution.
The recent elections in Ukraine have done little to calm the ferment there, and the insubility
could well spread 1s its immediate  neighbours, jeopardizing all the effors being made :in the
area extending from the Baltic states to the Danube'
Closer to home, in Central and Eastem Europe, and particularly in the Balkans' the old
specftes of nationalism and ethnic rivalry have revived'
Impotent to resolve the Yugoslav conflict" the EU has still not managed, despite genLerous
financial support and the Stability Pact initiative, to "sell" the benefits of economic and
political integration to these countries. To do so will take time, and will call in additi<ln for
powers of persuasion and leadership which can hardly be mustered in the absence of a
common  evaluation,  a shared agenda and a coordinated approach - in other words, a proper
common foreign and security policy. lmporunt principles are at stake: the inviolability of
frontiers, to be changed only by common consent, an understanding of modern concepts of
sovereignty,  and the need to build up a solid fabric of interlocking  interests.
The eastern and southern Mediterranean area from Turkey to Morocco is racked by deep-
seated but acute demographic, e@nomic and ecological rifu which, taken together, constitute
a veritable time-bomb. If these pressures  cannot be defused in time by the joint efforts of the
EU, the internadonal  comrnunity  and the countries concerned,  they will ultimately undermine
the legitimacy of the state and fuel the sort of repressive, anti-western  religious
fundamentalism  seen in AJgeria.
We are already beginning to see the implications of the evils spawned in these conditions
both for people in the countries concerned and for the security of our own societies, from
terrorism and drug trafficking to the proliferation  of weapons of mass destruction c'rupled
with missile technology  and modern control and inteltigence  techniques, to say nothing of the
With frightening speed Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, resurgent
religious and ethnically-inspired nationalism,  sporadic xenophobia and isolationist tentlencies
(even within the EU), the Mediterranean, Islamic militancy, nuclear proliferation  and
organized crime have all developed into major threats to the EU's security. And yet the EU
is still failing to tackle them - unless you count ringing declarations - precisely for lack of a
corlmon foreign and security policy worthy of the narne'7
Faced with srrch threats, each instance of pocrastination still further undennines the Union's
credibility in the eyes not only of the United States, which looks to us for sound
"parhershipn,  but of its partners, its potential enemies,  and finally its own citizens, who are
unlikely to go on giving their allegiance b an enterprise  which gives them no sense of a
common destiny or common id€ntity and no clear echo of shared, but increasingly  vulnerable,
values.
The CFSP is a viurl necessity in these dangerous times when a new international order is
stuggling  to be bom. It is thus a matter of some urgency.
Faced with the evidence of dysfunction" deficiencies and a lack of either any political will or
the necessary sense of urgenq-, we went on to consider what steps should be taken. We
identified a number of obvious practical steps which could be taken without amendments  to
the teaties bur which would, re felt" nevertheless do much to grve the CFSP and the WEU
a modicum of the substance and consistency which has so far been desperately lacking. But
these initial measures would not be enough and it is essential to grasp the oppornrnity  offered
by the IGC in 1996 to go further - much firther, particularly  in the context of enlargement -
and to chart an irreversible  course with a firm timetable and set of commitnents  towards the
construction  of the full CFSP, including collective defence arrangements.8
Measures which can be adopted without any lmendments  to the Treatiexl
A-  Creation of a centrel tnalysis rnd evaluation capability based on the
decision-making process
The strength of the Treaty of Rome, apart from *" *odnrring political will of a quorum of
Member States (.'nd in particular France and Gennany)  and the ac*eptance of legally binding
and verifiable corrmitments  in spheres of Community competence,  undoubtedly  derived from
the establishment of an independent  institution  with a central role in policy formation and the
rigbt of initiative: the European Qsmmission.
Even though that key feature of the Community system cannot" under the terms of the
', - Maastricht Treaty itsell be canied over unchanged into the sphere of the CFSP, vre feel
56msrhing  of the sort is require4 in a forrr which can reconcile the special demands of
foreign poticy and military and defence issues with effective action by the Union, The
strengthening of the second pillar based on improved analysis and representation  on the
international scene could only be achieved in stages.
It is just as important for the CFSP as for any other policy that stmctured  disctnsion in the
Council and the adoption of any decisions be grounded in a common analysis. lfhis is
incontestably  the fust step in strengthening  pillar II.
It is inconceivable that the present system - fragmented, Iacking a "motor", unequip,ped  to
provide a coherent  view of the total political, economic and military picture - could ever
perform adequately.
Admittedly,  national policy planners now meet their Commission  opposite numbe,rs  and
those - few as yet - from the Council's General Secretariat rather more frequently than they
used to (every two or three months). But even supposing their reports were to take on some
substance (which would entail upstream input from the technical working parties and rrllevant
Commi5sisn  deparbnents), there would still be no guarantee,  as things stand, that they would
actually feed into the preparation of decisions, a task currently hovering somewhere b,etween
the Political Committee, which has little time and is in any case exceeding its suppsedly
consultative  brief, and Coreper, which already has its work cut out with strictly Community
business.
We urcrcrore advocate r.wrrnout awaiilne the outcome of the IGC) the imrnediate
establishment of a eenuinelv independent permanent cental analvsis and evaluation capabilitv
in Brussels. based on the decision-making process (see Section fV.C) and endowed with the
necessar.v studv and information capacitv.
It should cover all aspects of the common foreign and security policy, including rnilitary
aspects, and the external dimensions of terrorism and organized  crime.
IU.9
It should therefore combine all the requisite expertise (which dictates a tripartite  Council-
Commission-WEu  composition  and in all likelihood a joint service involving the three
bodies), as well as being able to draw on active support (including  access to information)
from all institutional components  of the CFSP, that is, the Member State govemments  and the
Commission,  and the WEU.
The main task of this new body which initrally (until the end of the IGC) would be under the
responsibility  of a special adviser nominated by the European  Council, would be not only to
carry out ongoing evaluation of risks and threats to the Community's  interests and values, but
to prepare strateeies for response to be discussed by the European  Council and the Council
reflecting the range of options actually available to the Union and its Member  States.
It would also report annually to the European Council and Parliament  on the state of the
Union's security with the aim of improving  awareness  of the problems, providing a forum for
dralogue and democratic  debate, and thus fostering the gradual emergence and formulation
of a common doctrine enjoying widespread support among the citizens of the Union.
In the perforrnance of its tasks it would also expect to maintain suitable relations with various
specialist institutes and groups or associations concerned wrth European security  issues.
The establishment of this central analysis and evaluation capability should obviously be
accompanied  by a thinning-out of the bodies which have sprung up to deal with the CFSP in
the Commission (DG IA) and in the Council's General Secretariat. Very careful thought
would have to be given to the institutional place to be occupied by the new body and its
management.
The aim of the group is that this central capacity for analysis and planning, directed by a
special Counsellor  designated by the European Council, should be the first step. Following
the IGC this body could then be directed by a political personality  designated along the same
lines as that for the President of the Commission (European Council and European
Parliament) and thus benefittrng from suffrcient  authority,  independance and duration in offrce.
At a later stage this person could also be given responsability for representing the Union
internationally, together with the President of the Commission.t0
B.  Upgrading  the operetionel basis of the CFSP and the WEU
The crucial financial and procedural questions here have already been allowed to drift
unresolved for a whole year.
Clearly, the CFSP needs both financial stability, with a multiannual allocation fixed in the
annual community budget and sufficient flexibility in the form of an adequate contingency
provision, since it wiil be called upon not only to sustain long-term strategies but also to deal
with the unexpected. At  the moment only a handful of the Member States combine
operational capacity with the requisite political margrn of manoeuwe, particularly for armed
intervention.
It is indeed fundamental  that the financing of the CFSP should be independent  from those
member states, prepared to act in the name of the Union, particularly  in the military arena.
We feel the Council and Parliament should b€ guided in their current discussions by thLis dual
requirement  for stability and flexibility, coupled with due awareness of the urgency of the
matter. A lenglhy stalemate, besides alienating public sympathy,  would inevitably hamper
the effectiveness of the CFSP and diminish its credibility still further.
Again under this heading, we believe that where a decision  has been taken in principle on a
joint action, or where intricate politicai negotiations  (mediation or exploratory talks) are to
be conducted on behalf o1'the Union, it would be helpful to appoint prominent individuals  or
designate  a "lead" country.
The human rights monitoring agency currently  being discussed by Parliament likewise reflects
a pragmatic approach to the improvement of the CFSP's operational  basis. The same would
apply in the military context to the sening-up by the WEU of a Standing Committee of Chiefs
of Staff modelled on NATO's Military Committee,  backed up not only by the Planning Cell,
which already exists but is chiefly responsible for contingency  planning, but by mediu:m- and
long-range operational  requiremenb  rrnits or even agencies to draft equipment specifir;ations
for the three forces. Thinking  along these lines, other possibilities occur: the accelerration,
upgrading and expansion of cunent or planned multinational prograrnmes (Helios and Osiris,
respectively)  for intelligence  and early-warning satellites, backed up by the capabilities of the
WEU's Space Centre at Tonej6n and perhaps coupled with technical and/or geogrrrphical
division of laboru with US facilities; the setting-up of an airborne Er.:ropean -ulitar r-.nsport
command in readiness for future intervention,  along the lines of NATO's AWACS force; or
the fleshing-out of the promising CJTF ide4 starting with specific pilot operations rvorked
out jointly by the WEU and NATO.1l
None of these measures would require amendments  to the Treaties. A further helpful step
which could also be taken now tmder the third pillar (cooperation in the fields ofjustice  and
home affairs) would be to set up a Union database with inforrration on all aspects of
terrorism and organized crime, linked to the Financial Action Task Force on money
laundering  set up in July 1989 at the Arche Summit.t2
C.  Promoting synergr: the three pillars
We are of the opinionthatjoint  (Commission/WEU-WEAG/Presidency)studies  should be put
in hand immediately, in cor{unction with the creation of the central analysis capability, to
investigate "hoizontal" issues which are inherently both crucial to Ernopean security and
dependent  on a large number of public and private sector players. The joint studies could
ultimately feed :nto Joint Commission-Presidency  proposals all the more smoothly if the
Presidency of the r-ouncil were to coincide with that of the WEU.
One obvious candidate for this teatment would be the rrays and means available to the EU
to reconcile its emergent  defence and security identity with the maintenance of an efficient
_ and competitive scientific, technological and industrial base for wqtpons production.
f,-
''Ho* 
can the present fragmented state of Europe's arns markets be overcome and their
requirements graduaily harrnonize4 while at the same time ensuring that ttre industrl' is able
to compete with the US giants and withstand the ever-fiercer  struggle for export marrkets?
Faced with a challenge of this complexity, we believe it is necessary to adopt a coherent
approach addressing "demand" (governments  and armed services), market acq:ss an<i
"supply", i.e. restructuring  of Europe's arms industries.
We should therefore like to see a study put in hand without delay into the possibility of a
standing committee  of WEU Chiefs of Stafl with its own specifications  agencies  for each of
the three forces, charged with haruronizing medium-  and long-term  requirements,  and another
study on the possible role of the Community in managing a coherent process of market
opening and restructuring  of the arms industries.
Joint studies of this kind could also be used in the context of the working relationship
between the Commissionand  the WEU, with backing in m^ny cases from the European Space
Agency, to foster synergy  between civilian and miliury R&,D progftlrnmes with the e:mphasis
on areas having a high dual-use technology content" in paticular:
satellite launchen
mili@ reconnaissance,  early-warning  and commrrn ications satellites
real-time data Uansmission
Iarge-capacity  parallel processing  systems
steatth technology  (arcraft, missiles and ships)
avionics and aerospace technology
aerospace monitoring of the marine environment
position-fixing and gurdance tecbnology
radiation and radiation protection technology
active and passive identification (IFF) technology.l3
A number of these joim technical studies could usefully be included in future WEU space
cooperation  program mes.
Another "shared comp€t€nce" issue and hence a candidate for joint stud.ies and possiblejoint
proposals is security of energy supplies. The Commission and the Member States, with the
help of the IEA in this instance, should certainly conduct  a joint rnalysis of the implications
of Central and Eastern European countries'  membership of the Union and the worrying
prospect of growing dependence on oil supplies from the Persian GuE and soon perhaps from
Iraq agarn, which is more or less inevitable in the medium term. The Union is also
increasingly  dependent on natural gas imports from Russia, Algeria and possibly  the Middle
East, and any study of these matters should cover the specific implications of this, with
narticu$ reference to the question of fixed supply lines (i.e pipelines).
In terms of the CFSP such a review might lead to a reassessment of the EU's political
relations with the GCC states and a better understanding of the linkage, in sensitive countries
such and Iran and lraq, between oil revenue, foreign policy aird weapons progfilrnmes.  With
binding agreements due to be signed shortly in connection with the European Energy Charter,
the economic and financial imptications of the review might also prompt the EU to start
thinking again at last about the lack of instruments to cover political risks, at least for certain
strategically important  energy projects (Russian natural gas and oil).
We wouid further lsssmmend that no time be lost in carrying  out joint studies, followed  by
joint CFSP proposals,  into (a) a @mmon system of arms export controls and (b) a common
prograrnme to combat trafhcking in radioactive substanc€s  and nuclear materials.
The imminent Council decision on a joint action for confrols on exports of dual-use goods
points to the way forward on issues of this kind which iie at the interface  between pillars, in
particular as regards the economic and security dimensions.
In order to overcome the false dichotomy of either dealing with everything  by means of
Community  directives, alterable by a qualified majority, or clinging to a dochinaire
intergovemmental  approach and throwing the baby of the acquis communautaire out with the
bathwater, we advocate proc€eding wherever possible by  means of  joint
Commission/WEU/Presidency  studies which can eventually form the basis for joint
Cornmission/Presidencyproposals. This more balanced and pragmatic  approach would make
it pos.ihle to reconcile  consideration  for the special nah[e of secruiqv issues. especia'llv
defence-related  ones, with concern for maximum collective efficiency, in the form of the
fullest possible exploitation of the scope for synergy between the tluee pillars.
The same adherence to a balanced and pragmatic approach guided us in our discussion of the
more ambitious  reforms which we consider  essential to the construction of a credible CFSP.
The scope of these reforms, however, is such that they would entail major institutional
changes requiring political decisions which can be taken only at the IGC in 1996.rv.
l4
Institutional reforms and changes for decision st the 1996 Intergoventmental
Conference
While the measures we describe in the previous section would undoubtedly  improve the
efficiency of the CFSP and add substance to the WEU, they fall short of what is rerquired.
It is essential to clarifi 6 anmlsr of fundamental  points, pre-eminent among them the early
establishment of an effective European force projection capability to support the CFSP; the
issue of collective defence and, in this context, the relationship betrveen the EU, WEU and
NATO; the creation of a capability for proposing decisions (right of initiative), touched on
above in connection with the central at'alysis and evaluation  capability described in
Section III A;  the decision-making  process applicable  to action by the EU, including
operations  in the military sphere; and, last but not least, the representation of the EUI on the
international political stage.
We have carefully studied all these questions, on the twin assumptions that new lt{ember
States with a long-standing tradition of neutrality will be participating  in the IGC and that the
prospect of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries is now firm. 'We had
also to consider the limp and ineffective performance witnessed to date sTithin the CFSiP itself
and the more restricted circle of the WEU.
Taking all these facts into consideration, we advocate a new, though not revolutionary,
deparfure clearly inspired  by the approach adopted for the single currency and the European
@ntral bank, not of course that there couid be any question of simply transposing it.
The common  foreign and security policy (including defence) has so far been abary, imprecise
objective. It must be transforrred into a specific goal, broken down into successive ,Cetailed
targets backed up by a firm timetable and objective conditions for participation.
A majority of us, while subscribing to this analysis, nevertheless feel it would be a mistake
to push matters too far or too fast.
Political realities on the one hand - successive enlargements, well-rehearsed political
misgivings and disparities in military resources - and strategic realities on the other - the
continued need for the US presenc€ and detenence  and the inescapable geopolitical weight
of Russia - dictate that a different approach should be taken in 1996 to the poolins of military
resou.;es to be used jointl-v at i,he service of the EU to back up --- comrlr.,^, *^-^-^^ *--
securitv policy (oower projection) on the one hand, which requires decisions to be taken at
an early date, and the issue of collective defence within the meaning of Article 5 of the
Brussels Treaty on the other, which calls rather for the charting in advance of an irerversible
process to be laid down in detail at a later date with the prospective new Member States and
the EU's main partners, notably the United States. A pivotal date in this context rnight be
1998, when the Brussels Treaty is due to expire.15
Any attempt to press ahead too fast with the core issue of collective  defence in 1996 would
simply leave some of the new members  exposed to no good purpose and make glaringly
obvious the nullity of a concept \ /hich depends for any substance, both de frclo and, some
would *y, de jure (cf Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty) on NATO and its integrated military
organization.
On the other hand, to ignore this issue and simply leave it out of the IGC altogether on the
grounds that it is too remote a prospect would inevitably cast considerable doubt, inside and
outside the EU, on the Union's ultimate political significance.
We feel in fact that this would be a real mistake, not to say seriously irresponsible,  in view
of mounting insecurity and looming challenges.
Having traced out the scope for reform and progress (the lack of a cornmon analytical
function having been dealt with above, as a factor not requiring Treaty emendments), we
should like to see attention focused in 1996 on the following five areas:
-  the cornmon miliury resources to be placed at the disposal of the EU (creation of a
European force projection capability) to support the CFSP;
-  progress towards common defence within the meaning of Article 5 of the Brussels
Treaty, in consultation with the United States and other major partners;
-  creation of a capability  with the right of initiative;
-  overhaul of the decision-making  process,
-  the representation  and profile of the EU on the international  political  stage.16
A.  Common military nesources  to be placed at the disposel of the EU in support of
the CFSP
The Union Treaty should explicitly provide among the EU's objectives for the building-up of
Eurocorps and other multinational  units designated  for the WEU into a sizeable European
intervention  force (the figure of 150 000-200 000 men has been mooted) with the necessary
command, inteli^o,ence and logistical components'
Together with this objective should go a timetable  and a set of minimum requirements for
participation, in terms of allocation  of forces, inrcgration of command  structures and effective
support for the concomitant  technological  and logistical  programmes - in other words'
additional contractual  obligations'
It should further be made clear in the Treaty that the intervention force, by definition at the
service of the EU and the protection  of its major interests and its values, must from the outset
receive political and financial backing from those Member States which do not rvish to
participate,  either because they lack the capability or for their o$n political reasons'
Ideally, we should like to see complete congruence between the countries participating  in the
European intervention  force and the members of the WEU, which has been cast silnce the
petersberg  Declaration in June 1992 as matrix for the operational development  of a c<lmmon
defence.
That would involve certain adjustnents to the decision-making processes of the CFiSP (see
Section D below) and the WEU-
We cannot rule out the possibility that a number of WEU members might be unwi:tling or
unable to commit themselves to full participation in the European intervention force'
That would make it nec€ssary  to set up new institutional machinery reserved for the countries
participating in the European intervention force, at the interface between European Council,
the CFSp and the wEU. The WEU would accordingly  retain only the defence responsibilities
covered by Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty.t7
B.  Moving towards collective defence within the meaning of Article 5 of the Bmssels
Treaty
A "common defence policy" and "common defence" are abeaAy explicitly provided for in the
Maastricht  Treaty, so the objective in this case would be to map out in 1996 the stages
Ieading to collective defence, given the state4 if as yet unre,alizrA, existence of a "European
defence identity" and a "European pillar" of NATO.
Progress towards a common defence would cenfte on the insertion in the Treaties, say by the
yar 2000, of a mutual assistance commitnent  binding all members of the EU; this in turn
would entail the achievement  of full congruence by that &te betvreen WEU and EU
membership, as a prelude to a merger.
An interim date should also be set - 1998 looks particularly  suitable - to take stock of the
process, on the assumption  that intensive consultations would have taken place by then with
the EU's main partrrers, in particular the United States.
In the intervening period it is important to ensure the coherence of EU policy regarding
membership  of the WEU and NATO. Several members of the group considered that new
members of the EU seeking  to join WEU should also join NATO.
This was important  to preserve the integrity of article V of NATO and was a continuation of
the present policy of WEU members also belonging to NATO.
Other members of the group considered that the question of WEU membership  should be
examined on its merits, independently  of NATO membership.18
C.  Creation of a central capability  with the (non-exclusive) right of initiative
We are s6ongly of the opinion thaq in tandem with the evaluation capability described in
Section III A (and the need for a continuing, strong, visible presence on the intemational
scene (see point IV.E below), the CFSP needs something  to fulfil the role occupied in the
economic and monetary  sphere by the Commission.
The special nature rf foreign policy issues, particularly  those that require backing by armed
intervention  (power projection), and the even more special  status of defence  matters arer such'
however, that this role canno! as things stand, be played by the Commission itself, or at least
not by the Commission  alone.
Accordingly,  we should like to see the IGC look at the following two options:
(a)  either, introduction  on a systematic  basis, followed .by gradual extensiorL of joint
Commission/WEUiPresidency  proposals, closely coordinated with the central
evaluation capability, organised as a joint service between Council. WEIJ and
Commission;
O)  or, the introduction" within pillar II, a new institutional  mechanism  which would of
course affect the balance between the institutions.
This alternative merits a more detailed explanation. It could require placing the
cental plaruring and analysis capacity under the authority of a prominent personality,
designated in the same way as the President of the Commission and benefitting from
the same authority, independence  and duration in office. This person, in close lliaison
with the Commission acting within its own sphere of responsibility, wouid info:rm the
Council and European Council of all aspects considered essential for the security of
the Union, and formulate appropriate proposais; As regards his relationship  with the
WEU, this could have to be examined in the context of the future vote of this
organi53li6tt'19
D.  Reform of the decision-making  process
This is not something which can be tackled in isolation either from the creation of a rigftt of
initiative, based on a cental evaluation capability, or from the establishment of a European
intervention force and a clarly posted progmrune  srrlminaring in collective  defence
arrangements, for on these will depend to a great extent the effectiveness and credibility of
the EU's foreign and security policy decisions.
In particular, these are the things which will lend subsrance to the Council's discussions by
enabling it to address the full political, economic and military dimensions of each issue, up
to and including the use or threat of force, and thus underpinning  the formation of a political
consensus which will carry real weight.
But as the substantive content of Council deliberations  becomes more meaningful  th€y will
need to move beyond the uncertainties imposed by an over-rigid unanimity nrle. We
therefore propose that a distinction  be made between decisions with military implications and
those without.
In this context the group considered  but did not agree to retain the idea that there should be
a bottom line in the form of a "reverse Luxembourg comprornise"  which would prevent any
Member State from sustaining  a veto the pertinence of which was not accepted by a mdority
of the others.
Instead, the group considered  preferable, for decisions with no military implications - lltich
means most of them, luckily - qualified majority voting should be infroduced, though subject
to a special weighting which more accurately reflecs the different political and military
weight of individual Member States.
In the case of decisions with milita{v implications  it would be up to the members of the
European intervention  force, possibly meeting in restricted session in the @U or WELD
Council, to decide arnongst themselves on the resoruc€s to be deployed and action to be
taken, possibly in conjunction with other allies, in the knowledge that they can rely on the
political and financial backing of the whole Etl).
It may be objected that development  of the CFSP along the lines suggested (a reformed
Cecision-ma-king  proc?:s, joint ---litary res-urces, :crnmitrnent to rnove .owao *^1.:.tivc
defence, capability for evaluation and right of initiative) would pose a threat to Eunopean
integration, or rather to integration according to the "Community" model.
We do not share these fears, even if the emergence of what is already being refsrr€d to in
some quarters as a "hard core" of countries with the political will and power to act might
seem to be the logical conclusion  as things stand at present. [n our view the important ling
is that no Member State should be ruled out of the intervention force in advance and thzt the
waverers should not be able to stop those able and wiling to move forwards, in other words20
they should no longer have the power to stop the Union develqing a ctedible qomrrnn
foreign and security policy.
As regards the Commission, this approach by no means implies rh- it does not have a grea
deal to offer the CFSP in terms of analytical expertise and mobili7qt'a of economic, financial
and technical  resources.
What it does mean is that the Commission cannot be - and n fact hs never claimed to be -
the sole initiating and executive body in this conte)il that it is on tb economic side. 'fhat is
already accepted  in any case in resp€ct of monetary Datters and cooperation  in the fields of
justice and home affairs.
bur considered  view is that once the CFSP can leave behind its instifitional amtriguiry,
emerge from the straitjacket of the pure unanimig nrle (except for decisions having ndlitary
implications and only involving those who participare),  and acquire powerfuI evaluation
capability and right of initiative plus a credible milita$' instrument, it will rapidly endow the
EU with the major political starus it deserves.
In the following section we go on to demonstrate 6at such a sranrs cannot propr:rly be
confined within the cramped limits of the six-monthll'rotating  presllency and accompanying
troika.2l
E.  The EU's profile end representation  on the international  political stage
In addition to the reforms already discussed  we consider it essential that the EU have a
continuous  high-profile  presence on the international scene and we therefore suggest tbat the
European Council should designate  a prominent senior figure to personifr the CFSP over a
sufficiently long period of time. This figure would have one necessary  authority,
independence  and duration of office to lead the permanent  Brussels-basedevaluation capacity;
and would have the right of access and proposal to the European  Council and Council'
At a later stage this personage would reprcsent  the EU and together with the President of the
commission, where appropriate,  would give expression to its policies and decisions at the
highesl level.
He or she would therefore have the rigbt to attend meetings of the European Council and
ministerial meetings of the CFSP and WEU as long as this body continued to function
autonomously.
Working in close relations with the European Administration  (notably the President and the
Commissioner  responsible for CFSP) and &e Presidency of the Council  and WEU, this figure
would be assisted by a secretariat  and would receive any necessary assistance  from EU
representations and embassies abroad.
This outline agenda for the Intergovemmental  Conference in 1996 and the preceding
suggestions for measures which could if desired be implemented  more or less immediately
to lend greater weight and effectiveness to the CFSP are very far from exhausting the
substance  of the questions we tackled, utich are dealt wrth in greater depths in the reports
of individual members of the Group.
There is the fundamental issue of the ralues which should underpin a European securiry
policy. In this connection, we believe public debate and education (teaching  programmes,
L*op"un Defence Institute - see Annex 2) *ould have an important role to play'
Again, on a separate but not unrelated issue, there are the crucial concepts of the state, the
---ition, citizensliip.  ?n these i:ratters Ernope's history is irred.uc:.bly varicus - on'. cn r"-:i
understanding will support be forthcoming. The task of securing the necessary  alignrnent
while respecting the different identities uill be immense and exceeds the scope of the CFSP,
whose long,term efstence it will neverrheless determine.  This is a topic which merits a
further report to itself.
Finally, there is the unremitting  pursuit of the collective enterprise without which the
pre-eminent "public goods" of security and defence would soon lack all substance.22
Conclusions
Insofar as otu conclusions can be summarized, they are these:
l.  Foreign policy, security and defence issues are "special cases" to which it is
impossible  artificially to apply the "Community"  formulas which have proved their
worth in the economic sphere but are not to be imitated here.
2.  However, an effective response  to these issues calls, as in the case of the single
crurency, for an explicit statement of the objectives, procedures  and instruments of the
CFSP incorporating the following points:
-(a) definition of the joint military resources to be placed at the disposal of the EU
in support of the CFSP (timetable  and conditions for participation);
(b) mapping out of an irreversible course towards collective defence (within the
meaning of Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty);
(c) creation of a politicaly indenpendant  central capability with the (non-excl.usive)
right of initiative (based on a central analysis and evaluation capability);
(d) a reformed decision-making process for decisions not having military
implications;
(e) continuous  high-profile presence on the intemational political scene.
Those items should form the core of the agenda at the 1996 IGC as far as the C.FSP is
concerned.
Attached as Annex 3 is a diagram giving a preliminary  idea of the institutional implirlations
of such an approach."*t 2,
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The inadequacy  of budgetary and military resources that is hampering UN a'rivities
is another aspect of the weakness of international diplomacy. This is a hugely
da-aging state ofaffairs, as, with economic and diplomatic  globalization, an effective
worldwide body is vital to the conduct of international relations. The dictates of
efficiency demand that all nations join in a concerted approach, starting with the
European Union itsel{ building up through the NorthAflantic Alliance and the CSCE,
and culminating in the United Nations.
There can be no prospect of establishing a credible, stable intemational order if we do
not rapidly set about making good the legal, doctrinal and operational shortcomings
of the current UN set-up.27
Annex 2
Values and the CFSP: an overviewl.
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High-level group of erperts on the CFSP
Sub4rouP 4t
The CFSP and values
Overview
International relations involve more than just the interaction of might and the law'
There is also a third dimension,  thar of the values that underpin all societies, and
without which it would not be possible to establish a fair and peaceful international
order.2
The GFSP would be limited to defending the interests of the union, reducing
intemational relations to a simple question of power politics, if it were not for the
influence of fundamental and univenal values like liberty, justice, solidarity, and
democracy guided by the primacy of human rights and the rule of law.
These cannot be abstract, academic concepts,  but must be living values that all
Europeans not only acknowledge and observe, but would' if necessary, be prepared
to fight for. A foreign policy based on values that the majority of citizens do not share
would quickly lose legitimacy and public support" which is why, as we enter a new
phase of our history, the views of Europe's citizens and public opinion formers are of
paramount  importance  to the CFSP. We must also take care to establish a balance
between goups lobbying on the basis of values, and those lobbying on the basis of
economic  interest.
Article J.l of the Maastricht  Treary requires the CFSP to reflect the essential values
common to all the Member States, thus imbuing the legislation  with the force of those
values.
This requirement  is all the more justified now that" in the face of rapid globalization
and the end of the ideological conflict between East and West' culture is emerging as
a key factor in establishing an identiq' on the world stage, and culnfal differences are
being accentuated to such an extent that they could become the main focus of
international conflict in the futue if we do not defuse potential antagonisms in this
oi-ea thlo*gh cooperation  and conciliation.' If the CFSP plays down the impact of
chair:  Rcv. Hcrr: Membcrs: Rcv. Bourdcau:r,  Mr Durionq  Mr Frisch, Mr Hcisbourg.
Thc tcrm "vatues' cmbraccs  rdcology, culturc and rcligon, i.c. thc reprcscntativc systcflls  all socictics  need to survive'
Hunrington, "The clash of civilizations"  in thc 'Forcign Alfairs' issuc of l6 July 1993.
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values and cultural issues, it will be turning its back on a historical tend at the worst
possible moment, namely Europe's  transition from an economic to a political entity.
Using the CFSP to safeguard the main values shared by all Europeans poses delicate
practical problems  because of the diversity of the cultural models involved and the
emergence of new areas of security-related applicatioq  such as international terrorism,
nuclear proliferafion,  comrption and drugs.
The defence of human and minority rights, and the transition to democracy and free
enterprise, must perforce be a gradual, duty differentiated process, with the proviso
that decisions in this connection must not be arbitrary, but should follow criteria and
rules that are as objective as possible. The CFSP can under no circumstances  sanction
-the consolidation of repressive or oppressive regimes, nor can it contribute to the
proliferation  of prohibited arms. Any response must be proportionate  to the gravity
of the violation concerned;  forced child labour and tortue cannot be put on the same
footing as the freedom of association.
The increase in tensions and conflicts brought about by nationalist,  ethnic and
religious tendencies  confirms the dangerous potential of current cultural trends. This
should prompt the Union to foster understanding between different civilizations as a
matter of course, identifuing areas of both incompatibility  and convergence and
agreement with a view to promoting  coexistence and cooperation  based on mutual
awzlreness.
It might be useful to set up a European body for that purpose (e.g. a European
Foundation for Cultures and Retigions),  that would be supported by existing national
institutions  and would initially focus on regions where monotheistic religions
predominate. The role of such a body could include creating special educational
programmes at secondary and university level, and youth exchange  schemes'
The demise of the East-West divide appears to have initiated a "moralization" of the
international stage, but a great deal remains to be done to develop this process. We
have made virtually no progress as regards either doctrine, legislation  or instruments.
We are in for a long haul, but it is important that we get down to work on filling in
the gaps and rectifying the current weaknesses of international action.
The fighting in Somali4 Rwanda and former Yugoslavia has focused the spotlight  on
the problems  inherent in humanitarian  and democratic intervention, but without
establishing precisely what the concept involves, its scope or its limitations;  is it' for
example,  a righ! or is it a dutY?
Minorities  are frequently on the receiving end of conflict situations. Should we not be
aiming at establishing  a Charter for Minorities, to be signed under the aegis of the
United Nations?
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The inadequacy  of budgetary and military resources  that is hampcring  UN activities
is another aspect of the weakness of international diplomacy. This is a hugely
danagng state of affairs, as, with economic and diplomatic globalization, an effective
worldwide body is vital to the conduct of international  relations. The dictates of
efficiency demand that dl nations join in a concerted approach,  starting with the
European Union itself, building up through the North Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE,
and culminating in the United Nations.
There can be no prospect of establishing  a credible, stable intemational  order if we do
not rapidly set about making good the legal, doctrinal and operational  shortcomings
of the current IJN set-up.